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This note explores the interaction between trade integration and
asymmetric choices of technology adoption. It seeks to bring micro
foundations of ￿rm heterogeneity into an open-economy model. By so
doing, the analysis shows the complementarity between an imperfect
competition framework of strategic substitutability and a system of
preferences specially well suited for general equilibrium analysis. Pre-
liminary results, still in partial equilibrium, con￿rm standard claims
on price reduction and the ability of economies of scale to facilitate
technology adoption. More interesting, the number of active ￿rms is
reduced by the increase in market size and subtile interactions arises
from demand aggregation.
1 Introduction
Firm-level heterogeneity is one of the major stylised facts extensively doc-
umented by applied micro-level studies, specially those at the frontier of
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1industrial organisation and trade literatures (see for instance Dune et al.
1988; Tybout, 2003; Greenaway & Kneller, 2007). Firms belonging to the
same industry are di⁄erent in several aspects, namely isize and productivity.
This holds true if we vary the period, the sector de￿nition or the country
under consideration. Heterogeneity within a given industry is closely related
to the continuous process of ￿rm renewal as the type of ￿rm that enters and
exits the market alters the shape of the distribution of ￿rm characteristics.
Most of theoretical e⁄orts, specially those of trade literature inspired by
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), have been devoted to take into
account these patterns in the analysis of industry outcomes and have been
able to encompass several ￿rm-level empirical facts. However, they are silent
about the question of the origin of heterogeneity, notably in terms of marginal
costs, often assumed as a random variable drawn from a negatively skewed
distribution. On this line, the story is one in which everybody would like to be
a superstar, no matter the context, and only a few, exogenously well endowed
or lucky, succeed in practice. One exception is Ederington and MacCalman
(2008) who brings into an open-economy model a theoretical toolkit helping
to analyse the timing of technology adoption. The key idea is that, under
the assumption of technological di⁄usion, some ￿rms may prefer to invest
later in order to pay lower sunk costs. Hence ￿rms are di⁄erent because they
adopt a performant technology at di⁄erent dates. This line of attack puts
forward industry evolution as a determinant of ￿rm heterogeneity. Pro￿ts at
equilibrium, however, are the same for all ￿rms.
This note asks related but di⁄erent questions : what if sometimes it
worth to be small (in size and pro￿ts) relative to their competitors? what
if entrepreneurs, depending on the context, choose to produce with low or
with high marginal costs? How does economic integration may a⁄ect these
decisions? We are then concerned with strategic behaviour rather than with
dynamic issues. Consequently we rely on a particular strand of the industrial
organisation literature that has given some simple and deep answers to the
question of ￿rm heterogeneity and, by doing so, explored the problem in a
rich and tractable context, that of a Cournot competition game.
While usually seen as less appealing than price competition, competition
in quantities (Cournot oligopoly) appears as a good starting point to study
strategic interactions. Contrary to monopolistic competition, here ￿rms take
into account the e⁄ects of their actions on industry-level outcomes. For
instance, it is a natural feature in a Cournot game with free entry that
a new entrant anticipates the changes in pro￿ts generated after she enters
2the market. In what we are concerned, the retrospection starts with the
work of Mills and Smith (1996) who in a simple two-stage Cournot model of
technology adoption (henceforth CMTA) showed the existence of asymmetric
equilibrium for a duopoly: ex-ante identical ￿rms end-up tacking di⁄erent
decisions. As the title of Mills and Smith (1996) summarises: it pays to be
di⁄erent. To understand this claim, recall the equilibrium concept of Nash
(1951), which is the one used here. At equilibrium each ￿rm, fully aware of
the strategies of the others, has no incentive to change its technology choice,
even if this implies to be (disadvantageously) di⁄erent. It is then crucial that
￿rms anticipate the e⁄ect of their actions at the industry level. For instance,
it can be the case that being another big ￿rm may make lower the equilibrium
price too much.1 Mills and Smith (1996)￿ s result was generalised by Elberfeld
(2003) to the case of multiple ￿rms. In a more sophisticated fashion, these
concepts are used in Elberfeld (2002) to obtain further analytical insights on
the Stigler (1951)￿ s hypothesis linking the e⁄ect of market size and vertical
integration. An interesting feature of Elberfeld (2002) is to explicitly consider
the e⁄ect of free entry in downstream and upstream markets. While rich in
its results, such a deep scrutiny complicates the analysis for our focus. More
recently, G￿tz (2005) revisited the basic CMTA when free entry applies.
He provides general conditions concerning the existence of symmetry and
uniqueness. As the focus of G￿tz (2005) is on general characteristics of the
free entry game, the analysis of asymmetric outcomes is derived from the
symmetry requirements and it mainly relies on numerical examples.2
In the present work, the full analytical characterisation of this equilibrium
is obtained with the aim to study the possible e⁄ects of economic integration.
The choice of the CMTA as the basic framework seeks to keep the represen-
tation as simple as possible. We work with the simplest technology choice: a
high (or large-scale) technology and a low (or small-scale) technology. Free
entry, however, must be analysed in a more complex way by considering the
integer constraint. Intuitively, in our context, even only one large-scale ￿rm
exiting the market can lead to the entry of several small-scale ￿rms. In order
to visualise how the model predict the e⁄ect of economic integration, the
results of another strand of the literature are invoked. They are well sum-
marised in Neary (2009) whose e⁄ort is devoted to bring oligopolistic features
1For a more general theoretical analysis of the emergence of asymmetric equilibrium
see Amir et al. (2010).
2For an application of G￿tz (2005)￿ s results to FDI see Elberfeld et al. (2005).
3into general equilibrium. The development of Neary (2009) and related works
(mainly cited there in) proves to be quite complementary for what we are
endeavouring to do here. The inclusion of free entry and endogenous hetero-
geneity is something that can enrich that analysis. In this note we explore
asymmetry in an integrated world of two similar countries (not necessarily
identical) and limit ourselves to properly apply preferences aggregation for
the product market equilibrium. As it become clear in a moment, several
insights are worth to mention even at this ￿rst step of the walk from partial
to general equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper presents the model and some of its features.
Section 2 derives the asymmetric equilibrium for the CMTA with free entry.
Section 3 presents the preference system that will help to understand how
the skewness of marginal cost distributions is a⁄ected when a country opens
up to trade integration.
2 The CMTA with free entry
2.1 Formal setup
Consider an homogenous good market characterised by the following inverse
demand function
p = a ￿ by
where a and b are positive demand parameters, p is the price of the good
and y the total output in the industry. Firms are identical ex-ante but they
choose amongst two technology of production. By investing f0 a ￿rm can
produce with a small-scale (or low technology) at a constant marginal cost
of c0 . By investing f1 > f0 in large-scale (or high technology), ￿rms can
produce at a lower marginal cost c1 < c0 : The number of ￿rms and the
number of each type of ￿rms are determined at equilibrium.
We consider the following three-step game with technology adoption and
free entry. First, ￿rms belonging to an unbounded mass of potential entrants
decide whether to enter to the market or not. Upon entry they must decide
their technology of production. Firms then compete in quantities.
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4where ￿ is the set of low-technology ￿rms. For convenience, we have de￿ned
the parameter ￿ ￿ a ￿ c0.
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where ￿ is the set of high-technology ￿rms, ￿ ￿ c0 ￿ c1:
Backward induction starts from competition in quantities. We focus on
the Nash-equilibrium in quantities in which both type of ￿rms are active.
For a given technology, payo⁄s are the same so we can drop the subscript i
and simply identify low- and high-technology ￿rms by 0 and 1, respectively.
Denoting n the total number of ￿rms and m the number of low-technology
￿rms, we can state the asymmetric equilibrium in the ￿nal stage as3
y0 [m;n] =
￿ ￿ ￿(n ￿ m)
b(n + 1)
y1 [m;n] =
￿ + ￿(m + 1)
b(n + 1)
(1)
￿0 [m;n] = ￿f0 +
(￿ ￿ (n ￿ m)￿)
2
b(1 + n)
2 ￿1 [m;n] = ￿f1 +




The equilibrium in this type of game requires two sorts of conditions
(Elberfeld, 2003; G￿tz, 2005). First, entry should not be pro￿table for a new
￿rm (either as a large- or as a small-scale technology):
￿0 [m + 1;n + 1] < 0 ￿ ￿0 [m;n] (3)
￿1 [m;n + 1] < 0 ￿ ￿1 [m;n] (4)
Secondly, given the number of ￿rms, there must be no incentive to switch
from one technology to another. Hence
H0 [m;n] ￿ ￿1 [m ￿ 1;n] ￿ ￿0 [m;n] ￿ 0 (5)
H1 [m;n] ￿ ￿0 [m + 1;n] ￿ ￿1 [m;n] ￿ 0 (6)
3More details on computations are available upon request. For a sake of brievety,
mostly procedures of calculation are provided.
5If the no-pro￿table entry (NPE) conditions (3) and (4) and the no-
switching (NS) conditions (5) (6) are ful￿lled for a positive couple (m;n)
we have then an asymmetric equilibrium in which ex-ante identical ￿rms
end-up being di⁄erent due to strategic behaviour. Notice that both set of
conditions respect the integer restriction. This is important since the size of
a large ￿rm can be important enough to allow the entry of small ￿rms.
Let be Tk the average cost obtained by a ￿rm producing with technology
k 2 f0;1g in a symmetric free-entry equilibrium (i.e. if only technology k is
used). Cost advantages of high-technology ￿rms are de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between these average costs, viz:





Through all the model we work under the following assumption
Assumption 1 Cost advantages of high-technology ￿rms are positive
A > 0
2.2 Asymmetric partial equilibrium
2.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
It is useful to start the analysis from the pivoting (real) number of ￿rms
related to no-switching (eq. 3) and no-pro￿table entry (eq. 6) conditions.
For each k 2 f0;1g let m = hk [n] be the relation between m and n de￿ned
by Hk [m;n] = 0. After some algebra it can be veri￿ed that
h1 [n] = h0 [n] ￿ 1 (7)
h0 [n] =
￿b(f0 ￿ f1)(1 + n)
2 + n￿(n￿ ￿ 2￿)
2n￿2 (8)
The number of small ￿rms that (for a given number of total ￿rms) implies
zero rents from technological switching di⁄ers exactly by one, a result stem-
ming from the integer constrained formulation. Notice that the functions












2 < 0 (9)
Hence H0 [m;n] is monotonically increasing in m and H1 [m;n] monoton-
ically decreasing in m: This helps to understand the following lemma.
6Lemma 1 The number of low-scale ￿rms that simultaneously satis￿es
no-switching conditions (5) and (6) is the largest integer smaller than h0 [n].
Proof. Consider m = h1 [n]: Then H1 [m;n] = 0 (by de￿nition). From
(7) it follows that H0 [m + 1;n] = 0 and hence, from (9);H0 [m;n] < 0:
Conversely, consider m = h0 [n]; by the same reasoning one has H0 [m;n] = 0
and H1 [m;n] < 0. Hence, by (9), the integer belonging to the interval
[h1 [n];h0 [n]] veri￿es (5) and (6) for k 2 f0;1g:It also follows immediately
from (7) that this integer value is unique and it su¢ ces to consider largest
one smaller than h0 [n]. Because for each extreme of the interval, at least
one inequality is strictly veri￿ed, the knife-edge case where h0 [n] or h1 [n]
are themselves integers is excluded.
Consider now the requirements of no-pro￿table entry. For each k 2 f0;1g
let m = gk [n] be the relation between m and n de￿ned by ￿k [m;n] = 0. More
precisely gk [n] is the positive root of ￿k [m;n] = 0 when solving for m.4
g0 [n] =
p




bf1(n + 1) ￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, there exists a positive real n￿ verifying
for both technologies zero pro￿ts and zero rent from switching. This pivoting






















Proof. The n￿ solving h0 [n] = g0 [n] is the same than the one solving h1 [n] =
g1 [n] because both equations are related through the underlying relationship
4For m = g1 [n] only one root is positive whereas for m = g0 [n] two roots can potentially
be positive. The excluded one implies negative pro￿ts for ￿rms-1 at equilibrium, which
excludes the asymmetric equilibirum
7(7). Solving the system amounts then to solve the reduced equation g1 [n￿] =
g0 [n￿]￿1. The implied number of small ￿rms is obtained from m￿ = h0 [n￿]:




















bf0 < ￿ <
p
bf1 (12)
the asymmetric equilibrium satisfying (3)-(6) exists and it is unique. In such
equilibrium, the total number of ￿rms is the largest integer smaller than the
real number n￿and the number of low-technology ￿rms the largest integer
smaller than m￿:
Proof. If (m￿;n￿) is an asymmetric equilibrium it must verify m￿ > 1 and
n￿￿m￿ > 1 as well as conditions (3)-(6). Restriction (11) ensures m￿ > 1 and
n￿ ￿ m￿ > 1 under Assumption 1, which is included in the LHS of (12). By
proposition 1 no-switching conditions (5) and (6) are satis￿ed by h0 [n￿].
No-pro￿table entry conditions (3) and (4) are also ful￿lled because
(i) ￿0 [h0 [n￿];n￿] ￿ 0 is veri￿ed by construction as ￿0 [h0 [n￿];n￿] = 0:











0 under Assumption 1. Observe that there is a monotonic decreasing response
of ￿0 to the entry of small ￿rms :
@2￿0
@m@n < 0 if ￿ > ￿(n ￿ m);which is true
whenever small ￿rms have positive production; see equation (1).
















2 < 0 holds true under Assumption 1 and ￿ <
p
bf1;
the RHS of (12). Also, ￿1 presents a monotonic decreasing response to the
entry of large-scale ￿rms as
@￿1
@n < 0:
It is useful to follow G￿tz (2005) and represent the equilibrium conditions
in the (m;n) space (Figure 1). In such a graph, the zero pro￿t conditions





For each type of ￿rm, pro￿ts are negative or positive depending one situates
bellow or above the respective zero pro￿t condition. Call D the horizontal
8distance between both lines at the horizontal intercept. One of the main
results of G￿tz (2005) for our case is that (leaving integer concerns aside),
if D > 1 the equilibrium is symmetric with only large-scale ￿rms active.
Intuitively, if we have only small ￿rms making zero pro￿ts (i.e. if we are
at g0), the entry of low-marginal cost ￿rms is pro￿table as long as we lie
above g0: Loosely speaking, one can move to the right and there is pro￿table
switching from the low to the high technology. At point of zero low scale
￿rms no reversal switch is pro￿table because the vertical distance is greater





The asymmetric equilibrium characterised by proposition 1 implicitly con-
siders this claim. Analytically, the condition e n1￿e n0 < 1 with gk [e nk] = 0 (i.e.
when symmetry should not hold) is certainly veri￿ed by the RHS of (11).5
In the (m;n) space, NS-conditions are satis￿ed within the region depicted
by the curves h0 [n];h1 [n], which are separated vertically by a distance of
1. When solving for n￿ this distance is taken into account by the underlying
relationship h0 [n] = h1 [n] ￿ 1 (see proof of proposition 1). The example of
Figure 1 (f1 = 3000;b = 1=800;f0 = 1;￿ = 2:3;￿ = 2:5) is that of close zero
pro￿t conditions (solid lines), that is to say when D > 1 does not hold. The
points along the zero pro￿t line g0 that are within the parallels h0;h1 (dashed
lines) are then equilibrium candidates.
5Considering the integer constraint the requirement for symmetry is D > 2. This leads




The following utility representation closely follows Neary (2009). Consider
consumers preferences as being linearly additive over a continuum of goods
(sectors) of mass 1. The sub-utility associated to each of them is represented
by a quadratic functional form:















j stands for the jth moment of consumption levels. The single repre-
sentative consumer maximises (13) subject to the budget constraint, whereby,









where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier that "penalises" the excess of consumption
and hence represents the marginal utility of income. Its value is obtained







0 p[z]dz and ￿2p ￿
R 1
0 p[z]
2 dz are the ￿rst and the second mo-
ments of the distribution of prices across goods. The endogenous marginal
utility of income ￿ contains all economy-wide information that is taken as
given within industries. It is then the key to bring our previous results further
to general equilibrium.
3.2 Aggregate demand in the integrated economy
Neary (2009) shows that the indirect utility function of the system of pref-
erences used here follows a Gorman polar form (see Gorman,1961). If the
demand parameter ￿ is the same for all individuals the demand structure is
quasi-homothetic and the results of Gorman (1953,1961) about aggregation
of preferences can be applied here. As long as ￿ is the same for all individuals,
the intercept of the Engel curves may di⁄er across countries (and/or individ-
uals), but these income-consumption paths remain parallel straight lines. If
there is free trade between a home country, with the same economic structure
described so far, and a foreign country with similar preferences (identi￿ed by
*), then the world economy presents the following inverse demand for each
good z,
p[z] = a ￿ bx[z]
where a ￿ ￿+￿￿
￿+￿￿;b ￿
￿
￿+￿￿ and x[z] ￿ x[z] + x￿ [z]. Hence we can directly
apply our results for the CMTA with free entry, provided that.
x[z] = y [z] + y
￿ [z]
with y = my0 [m;n;z] + (n ￿ m)y1 [m;n;z] and similarly for y￿
11The demand parameter b is usually interpreted as negatively correlated
with market size. The aggregation of demands teaches us that not only the
market size parameter is modi￿ed in the open economy, but also the intercept
of the perceived oligopolistic demand. It is only in the case of identical
countries that a remains unchanged. As a participates in the determination
of the number of small-scale ￿rms m￿ (through ￿ ￿ a ￿ c0), this observation
can have consequences on the number of large-scale ￿rms ‘￿ = n￿ ￿ m￿:
In the previous section we showed that the asymmetric equilibrium exists
for a wide range of parameters constellation. We can now assume those con-
ditions (derived in proposition 1) and, after relaxing the integer constraint,
analyse the e⁄ect of trade integration in terms of marginal e⁄ects on markets
structure variables. The following results can then be established:
Proposition 2 Within the parameter region de￿ned by proposition 1,
relative to the autarky situation, trade integration between countries of iden-
tical technology but not necessarily identical demand intercepts, implies that
(i) the number of small-scale ￿rms m￿ and the number active ￿rms n￿
decrease
(ii) the percentage of large-scale ￿rms ‘￿
n￿ increases, but this variation is
modulated by the change in the intercept
(iii) the markup and pro￿ts of large-scale ￿rms increase
(iv) price decreases
Proof. The proposition is proved by the properties of the CMTA equilibrium
with free entry. We can capture market size through the inverse of b and the
intercept by ￿ ￿ a ￿ c0 since technologies are assumed to be identical. For
each part of the proposition, respectively, we ￿nd: (i)@n￿
@b > 0; @m￿




@￿@b < 0; (iii) p[z]jm￿;n￿ =
p
bf0 + c0 , which is the average






:On the other hand, from the proof of
proposition 1 we know that ￿1 [m￿;n￿] > 0: Thus, large-scale ￿rms have
larger markup. Finally observe also that
@￿1
@b < 0; (iv)
@(p[z]jm￿;n￿)
@b > 0
Our framework is quite di⁄erent than that of models with exogenous het-
erogeneity and monopolistic competition, such as, for instance Melitz (2003).
12Even if they go deeper in terms of factor and product market interactions as
well as export sorting, some comparisons can be made. There are some basic
features of our model that are familiar in those with exogenous heterogene-
ity, namely in terms of exit of high-marginal cost ￿rms and entry of more
productive ones, as well as, pro￿ts, size and markup heterogeneity (Melitz
and Ottavianno, 2008). Some important departures , however, arise here and
deserve further exploration. First, since heterogeneity is a choice for ex-ante
identical ￿rms, the total number of active ￿rms (at the world level) can be
reduced if market size increases. Thanks to scale economies, more producers
are willing to adopt a large-scale technology in the integrated world leading to
lower room for entry. This means exit or/and absorption of a subset of small
￿rms. Secondly, the increase in the proportion of high-technology ￿rms may
not be important if oligopolists in a given country perceive a low variation
of a. For di⁄erent countries this variation depends on general equilibrium









Figures 2 illustrate for f1 = 3000;f0 = 1;￿ = 2:3 the percentage change
of high-technology ￿rms when the inverse of b changes from 600 to 800 units
(to be read from the right to the left) and when the parameter ￿; that cap-
tures the change in a, ranges from ￿ to.2￿. Signi￿cant changes are only
observed for high values of ￿: Hence in a model with two identical countries
this variation is expected to be low. For the same parameter values Figure
3 shows that the downward change in the number of active ￿rms can be
sizeable specially for smaller markets.
13Figure 3.
4 Conclusion
In this note we have explored the ability of our framework to analyse some of
the interactions between trade integration and asymmetric choices of tech-
nology adoption. The micro economic environment of the Cournot model of
technology adoption under free trade has proved to be a good starting points
to obtain tractable solutions with deep insights on ￿rm decisions. The brief
discussion of demand aggregation shows that the use of this IO tool in inter-
action with a continuum-quadratic system of preferences can be a promising
way to obtain micro foundations of aggregate equilibrium outcomes usually
observed under ￿rm heterogeneity. This brief note can be extended in sev-
eral directions. Export sorting can be investigated by assuming ￿xed export
costs. More complex heterogeneity distribution can be investigated if we
consider multiple set of technologies. Under another line of attack one could
also go to general equilibrium by endogenously characterising the marginal
utility of income. We conjecture that such extensions are feasible within the
present framework and deserve further analysis.
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